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Combinatorial structures for Design of Wireless
Sensor Networks
Abstract. Combinatorial designs are very effective tools for managing
keys in an infrastructure where power and memory are two major con-
straints. None of the present day wireless technologies takes the advan-
tage of combinatorial designs. In this paper, we have proposed a general
framework using combinatorial designs which will enable the partici-
pating devices to communicate securely among themselves with little
memory and power overhead. The scheme caters for different kinds of
user requirements and allows the designer to choose different combina-
torial designs for different parts or levels of the network. This general
framework will find application in all wireless radio technologies, typi-
cally WPANs and WLANs. This is a hitherto unexplored technique in
wireless technologies.
Keywords: Combinatorial Design, Sensor Network, Key Pre-distribution,
Projective Plane, Transversal Design.
1 Introduction
Combinatorial designs are very effective tools for managing keys in an infrastruc-
ture where power and memory are two major constraints. None of the present
day wireless technologies takes the advantage of combinatorial designs. In this
paper, we have proposed a general framework using combinatorial designs which
will enable the participating devices to communicate securely among themselves
with little memory and power overhead. The scheme caters to different kinds
of user requirements and allows the designer to choose different combinatorial
designs for different parts or levels of the network. A few examples of WLAN
technologies are IEEE 802.11a/b/e/g/h/i, HiperLAN/2, HomeRF etc. and on
the other hand, Bluetooth, ZigBee, UWB etc. are examples of WPAN technolo-
gies.
Very recently it is reported that two researchers have been successful in crack-
ing the Bluetooth PIN [18]. The other wireless LAN technology protocol 802.11x
also suffers from several security loopholes: insertion attacks, interception and
monitoring wireless traffic, misconfiguration, jamming and client to client at-
tacks are a few of the important ones. For more details, one may refer to [7]. In
the following, we shall introduce the desiderata of wireless technologies.
1.1 Wireless Technologies: How the Properties of Radio Waves
Affect Networking Capabilities
An ideal radio wave for wireless technologies should have high speed, travel far
distances and consume little energy. Had such radio waves existed, it would have
been possible for us to transfer information very rapidly at any distance using
little battery power. Unfortunately, real radio waves do not behave like that.
The high speed and long range of a radio wave demands more energy. That is
why the designers of the wireless technologies try to optimise certain parameters
under a given condition. As a direct consequence, we find wireless area networks
of different orders (e.g., personal, local, metropolitan, global, etc.) and each of
them is suitable to a particular application or usage.
As an example, in wireless local area network (WLAN), the power consump-
tion is less important compared to range/speed whereas the design of a wireless
personal area network (WPAN) demands low power in preference to high speed
or long range.
For more details on wireless technologies, refer to [17].
1.2 Our Proposal: An Uncharted Territory
However, an unexplored area in the security of wireless technologies is the use
of combinatorial designs. Our proposal is an endeavour to propose the security
solutions in a wireless network using combinatorial designs. The method is not
restricted to smart homes only and may also find application in Hierarchical
Sensor Networks where the deployment of the sensor nodes may be made in a
more or less controlled manner. One can even think of other situation where a
hierarchical structure may be deemed fit. As an extreme example, suppose the
different countries of the world are divided into a few groups (possibly based
on their geographical locations), and a multinational company operates globally,
setting up branches in different countries. However, the management may decide
to delegate the authority to each of the branch offices in an hierarchical structure.
That structure may easily be translated to our model. In the following, we shall
talk about two specific application areas viz., smart homes and sensor networks,
though we have a common set of objectives in mind:
1. The entire communication in the network will take place securely.
2. The protocol will be as simple as possible.
3. The network will comprise of several logical parts. The network will be re-
silient to such an extent that the other parts will continue to function even
if one/more parts of the network are compromised.
1.3 Smart Homes
A smart home or building is a home or building, usually a new one, that is
equipped with special structured wiring to enable occupants to remotely control
or program an array of automated home electronic devices by entering a single
command. For example, a homeowner on vacation can use a Touchtone phone to
arm a home security system, control temperature gauges, switch appliances on
or off, control lighting, program a home theater or entertainment system, and
perform many other tasks. The field of home automation is expanding rapidly
as electronic technologies converge. The home network encompasses communica-
tions, entertainment, security, convenience, and information systems. For more
details, refer to [22].
Suppose we want to install the network in such a building. Naturally each
of the rooms of the building forms a “logical part” of the network. The nat-
ural user requirement would be that the devices in one room should function
independently of the devices of any other room. If one room has to be cut off
from the network, still the other parts of the building should be able to func-
tion unhindered. One can use same/different combinatorial designs to model the
different parts of the network.
1.4 Sensor Networks: A Brief Introduction
Secure communication among sensor nodes has become an active area of re-
search [2, 6, 9, 14–16, 10]. One may refer to [12] for broader perspective in the
area of sensor networks. Based on the architectural consideration, wireless sensor
networks may be broadly classified into two categories viz.(i) Hierarchical Wire-
less Sensor Networks (HWSN) and (ii) Distributed Wireless Sensor Networks
(DWSN). In HWSN, there is a pre-defined hierarchy among the participating
nodes. There are three types of nodes in the descending order of capabilities:
(a) base stations, (b) cluster heads, and (c) sensor nodes. The sensor nodes are
usually placed in the neighbourhood of the base station. Sometimes the network
traffic (data) is collected by the cluster heads which in turn forward the traffic
to the base station.
There may be three different modes of data flow as follows: Unicast (sensor
to sensor), multicast (group wise), broadcast(base station to sensor). However,
it may be pointed out that the HWSN is best suited for applications where the
network topology is known prior to deployment. On the other hand, there is no
fixed infrastructure in the case of a DWSN and the network topology is unknown
before the deployment. Once the nodes are scattered over the target area, the
nodes scan their radio coverage area and find their neighbours. In this case also,
the data flow may be divided into three categories (as discussed above) with the
only difference that the broadcast might take place between any two nodes.
In this paper, we shall talk about wireless sensor networks in general, possibly
with the exception of some special nodes with higher memory and/or compu-
tational capacity. Also we shall assume that the deployment is more or less
controlled.
The size of the sensor network is usually very large (say, of size N). The sen-
sor nodes are usually memory-constrained and that is why it is not possible to
maintain N − 1 keys in each sensor node so that ultimately different secret keys
are maintained for each of the pairs. The nodes often do not have much com-
putational capacity to implement public key framework (though very recently
implementations of ECC and RSA on 8-bit CPUs have been proposed [11]). Still
key pre-distribution solutions are bound to be much faster since they are less
computation intensive.
One usually faces a few problems in key pre-distribution. Often two nodes
are not directly connected and communicate through one or more hops. Also the
compromise of a few node results in the failure of a large part of the network
since the keys revealed were also shared between the other nodes. For a more
detailed account of these, please refer to [3–5, 1, 9, 14, 10, 15, 2].
1.5 Key Pre-distribution in General: Our Proposal
One possible solution is to have a situation where every node is guaranteed to
have a common key with every other node that it needs to communicate with.
For a very large network, this is not possible, as explained earlier. We propose
to divide the network into certain logical sub networks. Intra sub network nodes
always share keys with each other. For each sub network, we earmark a particular
node as a special node. Inter sub network communication takes place by the
communication between the special nodes of the respective sub networks.
The issues at this point are as follows:
1. One has to have some control over the deployment of the nodes.
2. For the special nodes, the number of keys to be stored in each node will
clearly increase. So one needs to decide the availability of storage space.
In [15, Page 4], it has been commented that storing 150 keys in a sensor
node may not be practical. On the other hand, in [9, Page 47], [14, Section
5.2], scenarios have been described with 200 keys. If one considers 4 Kbytes
of memory space for storing keys in a sensor node, then choosing 128-bit key
(16 byte), it is possible to accommodate 256 keys.
Thus the goal in this paper is to present a scheme that aims at failsafe
connectivity all-over the network. We differ from the existing works where it is
considered that any two nodes will have either 0 or 1 common key all over the
network. Our motivation is to have a design strategy where the entire network is
divided into a number of subnetworks. Any two nodes of a particular subnetwork
share a common key. The special nodes of different subnetworks share more
than one common keys. This is important from resiliency consideration in an
adversarial framework since even if a certain subnetwork is compromised, the
other parts of the network, i.e., the other subnetworks may function without
any disturbance. Moreover, even if one or more special nodes are compromised,
the other special nodes can still communicate among themselves. In other words,
the connectivity of the network is not disturbed at all.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: We begin with a preliminary
introduction to combinatorial designs. In the next section, we use a detailed
example to explain the problem and discuss the solution. The paper concludes
with the future research proposals.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Basics of Combinatorial Design
For a ready reference to set system, block design, BIBD, group-divisible design,
projective planes and transversal design, refer to [8, 20, 19, 21].
Projective Plane
A finite projective plane of order n is formally defined as a set of points with
the properties that:
1. Any two points determine a line,
2. Any two lines determine a point,
3. Every point has n + 1 lines through it, and
4. Every line contains n + 1 points.
(Note that some of these properties are redundant.) A projective plane is
therefore a symmetric (n2 + n + 1, n + 1, 1) block design.
A finite projective plane exists when the order n is a power of a prime,
i.e., for n = pa. It is conjectured that these are the only possible projective
planes, but proving this remains one of the most important unsolved problems
in combinatorics.
The smallest finite projective plane is of order n = 2, and consists of the
configuration known as the Fano plane. The remarkable Bruck-Ryser-Chowla
theorem says that if a projective plane of order n exists, and n = 1 or 2(mod4),
then n is the sum of two squares. This rules out n = 6. Even before that, Tarry
ruled out projective planes of order 6 by hand calculations. Lam [13] showed,
using massive computer calculations on top of some mathematics, that there
are no finite projective planes of order 10. The status of the order 12 projective
plane remains open.
The projective plane of order 2, also known as the Fano plane, is denoted
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Every row and column contains three 1s, and any pair of rows/columns has
a single 1 in common.
3 Key Predistribution in General: Our Approach
3.1 The Correspondence between a Combinatorial Design and a
Sensor Network
The blocks of the combinatorial design corresponds to a sensor node and the
elements present in a block represent the keys present in a sensor node.
Fig. 1. The Network
3.2 The Method
In [15], it has been shown that using a transversal design, there is direct con-
nectivity between two nodes in 60% of the cases. Overall, any two nodes can
communicate either directly or through an intermediate node (i.e., a two-hop
path) with almost certainty. For a large network, the compromise of even 10
nodes will render 18% of the nodes unusable.
Our approach is very different from the approach of [15]. In the diagram,
we have shown a network with only two levels of hierarchy. There may be more
levels depending on the user requirements. Our proposal is perfectly general and
fits into networks of any size. The root of the hierarchy tree is assumed to be
a central server, S. At the next level, x special nodes S1, S2, · · · , Sx are placed.
The leaf level comprises of the subnetworks NW1, NW2, · · · , NWx.
One has the freedom to choose different combinatorial designs for different
parts of the network. Again, that depends on the specific requirements of the
user. For example, if the sub networks are required to form a totally connected
network graph, one can choose projective planes. This may be applicable in case
of a smart home. If the subnetworks are very large in size and total connec-
tivity is not a requirement (i.e., if single/multi-hop connectivity is permissible),
transversal designs might be a reasonable choice.
Let us assume that we are using only projective planes in all the parts of the
network. We know that a projective plane of order n (n is a prime power) has
n2 + n + 1 number of blocks and each block contains n + 1 keys. If we use a
projective plane of order n, we can accommodate a network of n2 + n + 1 nodes
with n + 1 keys per node.
Let us assume that maxi|NWi| = α (for i = 1, 2, · · · , x), i.e., the subnetwork
size is at most α, so that a projective plane of order ≥
⌈√
α − 34 − 12
⌉
may be
used to model the subnetwork.
In fact, we should choose the sub network size n2 + n instead of n2 + n + 1
because we shall have to include the special node Si(at the next higher level)
corresponding to each sub network NWi. The corresponding projective plane is
of order
⌈√
α + 14 − 12
⌉
.
If we have x such sub networks, we have also x corresponding projective
planes. They may or may not be of the same order depending on the same
/ different sizes of the various sub networks. One can use different projective
planes for different sub networks NWi simple by replacing α by NWi in the
above expression.
Note that each of the subnetworks NWi including the special node Si, i.e.,
Si
⋃
NWi (for i = 1, 2, · · · , x) forms a complete network graph. Since we are
using a projective plane to distribute the keys in the underlying nodes, this
property is guaranteed. In other words, any two nodes of NWi
⋃
Si for i =
1, 2, · · · , x share a common key with each other.
Had we used a transversal design TD(k, r) instead of a projective plane, every
pair of nodes would not have been connected. However, a constant fraction of
the total number of pairs would have been connected (i.e., would have shared a
common key). It is easy to see that the value of the fraction is k
r+1 . Out of r
2
blocks of the TD(k, r), a particular block shares keys with kr − k = k(r − 1)
blocks. Excepting that particular block, there are r2 − 1 blocks in the TD(k, r).




At the next stage, we would like to have several common keys between any
two special nodes Sj and Sk. In order to achieve that, we may again choose
projective planes. A projective plane of order m ≥
⌈√
x + 14 − 12
⌉
will suffice to
connect all the Sis for i = 1, 2, · · · , x and also the root server S may be included
as the (x + 1)-th node. Using multiple copies (say t copies) of the projective
plane of order m, and labelling them differently, we easily obtain t common keys









The special nodes/devices (which may be the cluster head in the case of a
sensor network) should have more storage capacity in comparison with the other
nodes in order to accommodate t(m + 1) keys.
3.3 An Example using Projective Planes
Let us continue our discussion apropos of the previous network diagram, i.e.,
a network with only two levels of hierarchy. The root of the hierarchy tree is
the central server, S. At the next level, x = 18 special nodes S1, S2, · · · , S18 are
placed.
The leaf level comprises of the subnetworks NW1, NW2, · · · , NW18. Let us
use only projective planes all over the network.
Let us assume that maxi|NWi| = 900, i.e., the subnetwork size is at most
900, or, α = 900.
The corresponding projective plane is of order ≥
⌈√
900 + 14 − 12
⌉
≥ 30.
The next highest prime being 31, let us choose a projective plane of order
31.
Since we have 18 such sub networks, we have also 18 corresponding pro-
jective planes. They may or may not be of the same order depending on the
same/different sizes of the various sub networks. One can use different projec-
tive planes for different sub networks NWi simply by replacing 900 by |NWi| in
the above expression.
Note that each of the subnetworks NWi including the special node Si, i.e.,
Si
⋃
NWi forms a complete network graph. Since we are using a projective plane
to distribute the keys in the underlying nodes, this property is guaranteed. In
other words, any two nodes of NWi
⋃
Si share a common key with each other.
At the next stage, we would like to have several common keys between any
two special nodes Sj and Sk. In order to achieve that, we may again choose
projective planes. A projective plane of order m ≥
⌈√
18 + 14 − 12
⌉
≥ 4 will
suffice to connect all the Sis (for i = 1, 2, · · · , 18) and also the root server S may
be included as the 19-th node. Let us choose m = 4. Using multiple copies (say
4 copies) of the projective plane of order m, and labelling them differently, we









The special nodes/devices (which may be the cluster head in the case of a
sensor network) should have more storage capacity in comparison with the other
nodes in order to accommodate 4(4 + 1) = 20 keys.
3.4 Another Example Using Projective Planes and Transversal
Designs
Suppose we have a different kind of requirement. The sub networks are very large,
say each subnetwork may be of size 2500 and hence multi-hop communication is
permissible.
Again let us assume that the network has only two levels of hierarchy, the root
of the hierarchy tree is the central server, S. At the next level, x = 25 special
nodes S1, S2, · · · , S25 are placed. The leaf level comprises of the subnetworks
NW1, NW2, · · · , NW25.
At the sub network level, we do not have the requirement that any two nodes
should be able to communicate directly. So we may use transversal designs at
this level. However, since all the special nodes should be able to communicate
directly among themselves and need an enhanced level of security by having
multiple keys shared between any two nodes, we prefer to use projective planes
at this level.
Since the sub network may have 2500 nodes, we should choose a transversal
design accordingly. We know that a TD(k, r) has r2 blocks. We also know that
if r is prime, and 2 ≤ k ≤ r, then there exists a TD(k, r) [3].
Since
√
2500 = 50, we choose the next highest prime 53 as our r. Now we
can choose k according to our convenience. We choose k = 36.
As mentioned earlier, the key sharing probability between any two nodes of




Note that each of the subnetworks NWi including the special node Si, i.e.,
Si
⋃
NWi (for i = 1, 2, · · · , 25) does not form a complete network graph. Since
we are using a transversal design to distribute the keys in the underlying nodes,
any two nodes of NWi
⋃
Si share a common key with each other with probability
0.667.
At the next stage, we would like to have several common keys between any
two special nodes Sj and Sk. In order to achieve that, we may again choose
projective planes. A projective plane of order m ≥
⌈√
25 + 14 − 12
⌉
≥ 5 will
suffice to connect all the Sis for i = 1, 2, · · · , 25 and also the root server S may
be included as the 26-th node. Let us choose m = 5. Using multiple copies (say
4 copies) of the projective plane of order m, and labelling them differently, we









The special nodes/devices (which may be the cluster head in the case of a
sensor network) should have more storage capacity in comparison with the other
nodes in order to accommodate 4(5 + 1) = 24 keys.
4 Conclusion and Future Research
We shall further investigate networks where “users” have differing resources and
capacity requirements. One case involves a large network with large, mostly
self-contained sub-networks. Another case involves networks which need more
robustness at different levels of application. For example, at the second level of
hierarchy (i.e., the level containing the special nodes), one may need to have
different number of common keys shared between two given nodes. It will be an
interesting combinatorial problem to find out a design having such a property.
One may even look for better alternatives compared to the use of copies of
projective planes at this level.
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